The goal of this paper is to reinvestigate the role of causality in probabilistic modeling. We do this based on the observation that causal information is inherently information about probabilistic processes. For instance, if one says that smoking causes cancer, then this means that the act of having a cigarette will initiate some sequence of events within the human body, and that one of the possible outcomes of this process will be that a cancer develops. Typically, we are not interested in the details of this actual process itself, but simply care about the probability of it leading to a certain result, such as the development of a cancer. The central thesis of our paper is that causal information is in essence a compact and robust way of specifying just enough properties of the behaviour of a non-deterministic process to uniquely characterize the probability distribution that it generates.
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Let us first clarify some terminology. A probabilistic process is a succession of some 'atomic' events. Of course, which events are considered atomic depends on the granularity of one's world view, i.e., one could, for instance, consider the detailed interactions between cigarette smoke and the cells of the human lung tissue, or, more abstractly, simply observe that smoking tends to make people sick. Each such atomic event affects the state of the world in some, possibly nondeterministic, way. An event occurs at some particular time and, typically, also for a certain reason. It should be clear that events and processes of this kind play an important role in our intuitions about causality. From a knowledge representation point-of-view, this now naturally begs the question of where such events occur in our formal models of causal information.
One of the most popular approaches to modeling causal information about a probabilistic domain is that of causal Bayesian networks. In this language, the causal structure of the domain is described by a directed acyclic graph, in which every node corresponds to some unique random variable. The intuitive reading of such a network is that the value of every node is causally determined by the values of its parents in the graph. As such, from our point of view, the probabilistic processes described by such a network are those in which once the values of all parents of a node have been determined, there will occur an event that propagates these values to the node itself. In this way, a network specifies some properties of a probabilistic process, but not all. Indeed, for two nodes with no path between them, it does not say which of the events associated to these nodes will happen first. However, this information is not relevant for the probability distribution that will be generated, i.e., all processes that are possible according to the network will generate the same probability distribution. In this way, causal Bayesian networks fit into the claim we made above.
The kind of events admitted by a Bayesian network are obviously rather restricted. Firstly, only a single event can be involved in determining the value of any particular node. Clearly, in real life, many events might exert an influence on the same property. For instance, not only smoking might cause cancer, but also exposure to radioactivity, excessive sun bathing, and so on. Secondly, because of the acyclic structure of the graph, events can only propagate values in one fixed direction. In reality, this too is not always the case. For instance, if a patient has contracted pneumonia, then this might cause angina. Vice versa, however, if the patient first has angina, then this might also cause pneumonia. As such, in this case, the propagation of values can happen in both directions.
In our paper, we study a representation of causal events that goes beyond these two restrictions. Concretely, we consider what we call causal probabilistic events, or CP-events for short. Such an event is of the form E ← φ, which is read as "property φ causes event E." Here, φ is a formula of first-order logic and E is some formal representation of a probabilistic event. We then consider the language of CP-logic, which consists of all sets of such CP-events, called CP-theories.
According to our claims, a CP-theory describes some aspects of a probabilistic process. We now want to make this more precise and specify exactly what such a theory says about a process, or, to put it the other way around, which processes can be seen as corresponding to such a theory. Informally speaking, a probabilistic process corresponds to a CP-theory if and only if it satisfies the following three fundamental principles:
• The principle of no deus ex machina events: Events occur if and only if there is a cause for them to occur.
• The principle of independent causation: Every event represents an independent causal mechanism.
• The principle of temporal precedence: Whenever a property φ might cause an event E, then the part of the process that is involved in determining the truth of φ happens before the event E itself can happen.
In our paper, we formally define what it means for a process to satisfy these three principles. We are then able to mathematically support our claims by proving that all such processes do indeed generate precisely the same probability distribution. If, as we claim, causality is indeed inherently tied to the notion of probabilistic processes, then one would expect to encouter concepts similar to our CP-events in other causal logics. Moroever, by studying the relation of such logics to CP-logic, we will also learn how to represent causal probabilistic processes in these logics, which provides a valuable piece of knowledge representation methodology for them. Motivated by these observations, our paper relates CP-logic to causal Bayesian networks and various Logic Programming based approaches to causal and probabilistic reasoning, such as Poole's Independent Choice Logic and the causal logic of McCain and Turner.
As already mentioned above, CP-logic allows a less restricted kind of causal events than Bayesian networks do. This offers two significant knowledge representation advantages. Firstly, our principle of independent causation allows a better representation of effects that can be caused by a number of independent causes. The main advantage of CP-logic is that each cause for such an effect corresponds to a different CP-event, which makes the independence between these causes a structural property of the theory, rather than a numerical property of some probabilistic values in Bayesian networks. This improves the compactness and elaboration tolerance of the representation. Secondly, because of the principle of no deus ex machina effects, it is possible to directly and straightforwardly model cyclic causal relations (e.g., "pneumonia might cause angina" and "angina might cause pneumonia") in CP-logic. In Bayesian networks, on the other hand, such cycles have to be encoded in a more complicated way, by the introduction of additional random variables.
CP-logic is also related to a number of Logic Programming approaches. This relation can be established through a probabilistic way of deriving a normal logic program from a CP-theory. Our main technical result on this topic states that the probability of deriving a logic program that has a certain interpretation I as its model (according to the well-founded semantics for logic programs) is precisely the probability with which I will be the outcome of a process corresponding to the CP-theory. In our paper, we discuss the implications of this result with respect to normal and disjunctive logic programs, the Independent Choice Logic and McCain & Turner's causal logic.
In summary, the aim of our paper is to investigate the claim that causal information is in essence a compact way of specifying enough properties of the behaviour of a probabilistic process to uniquely characterize the probability distribution that it will generate. We do this by constructing the formal language of CP-logic, for which we devise a semantics based on three fundamental principles. We then show that every process that satisfies these principles does indeed generate the same distribution. Finally, we also relate this logic to a number of other causal approaches.
